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:: Friday, April 30, 2004 ::

Published in the May 17, 2004 issue of The Nation
Mutiny in Iraq
by Naomi Klein

Can we please stop calling it a quagmire? The United States isn't mired in a bog or a marsh in Iraq (quagmire's literal meaning); it is free-falling off a cliff. The only question now is: Who will follow the Bush clan off this precipice, and who will refuse to jump?

More and more are, thankfully, choosing the second option. The last month of inflammatory US aggression in Iraq has inspired what can only be described as a mutiny: Waves of soldiers, workers and politicians under the command of the US occupation authority are suddenly refusing to follow orders and abandoning their posts. First Spain announced it would withdraw its troops, then Honduras, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Kazakhstan. South Korean and Bulgarian troops were pulled back to their bases, while New Zealand is withdrawing its engineers. El Salvador, Norway, the Netherlands and Thailand will likely be next.

And then there are the mutinous members of the US-controlled Iraqi army. Since the latest wave of fighting began, they've been donating their weapons to resistance fighters in the South and refusing to fight in Falluja, saying that they didn't join the army to kill other Iraqis. By late April, Maj. Gen. Martin Dempsey, commander of the 1st Armored Division, was reporting that "about 40 percent [of Iraqi security officers] walked off the job because of intimidation. And about 10 percent actually worked against us."

And it's not just Iraq's soldiers who have been deserting the occupation. Four ministers of the Iraqi Governing Council have resigned their posts in protest. Half the Iraqis with jobs in the secured "green zone"--as translators, drivers, cleaners--are not showing up for work. And that's better than a couple of weeks ago, when 75 percent of Iraqis employed by the US occupation authority stayed home (that staggering figure comes from Adm. David Nash, who oversees the awarding of reconstruction contracts).

Minor mutinous signs are emerging even within the ranks of the US military: Privates Jeremy Hinzman and Brandon Hughey have applied for refugee status in Canada as conscientious objectors and Staff Sgt. Camilo Mejia is facing court martial after he refused to return to Iraq on the grounds that he no longer knew what the war was about [see Christian Parenti, "A Deserter Speaks," at www.thenation.com].

Rebelling against the US authority in Iraq is not treachery, nor is it giving "false comfort to terrorists," as George W. Bush recently cautioned Spain's new prime minister. It is an entirely rational and principled response to policies that have put everyone living and working under US command in grave and unacceptable danger. This is a view shared by fifty-two former British diplomats, who recently sent a letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair stating that although they endorsed his attempts to influence US Middle East policy, "there is no case for supporting policies which are doomed to failure."

And one year in, the US occupation of Iraq does appear doomed on all fronts: political, economic and military. On the political front, the idea that the United States could bring genuine democracy to Iraq is now irredeemably discredited: Too many relatives of Iraqi Governing Council members have landed plum jobs and rigged contracts, too many groups demanding direct elections have been suppressed, too many newspapers have been closed down and too many Arab journalists have been murdered while trying to do their job. The most recent casualties were two employees of Al Iraqiya television, shot dead by US soldiers while filming a checkpoint in Samarra. Ironically, Al Iraqiya is the US-controlled propaganda network that was supposed to weaken the power of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, both of which have also lost reporters to US guns and rockets over the past year.

White House plans to turn Iraq into a model free-market economy are in equally rough shape, plagued by corruption scandals and the rage of Iraqis who have seen few benefits--either in services or jobs--from the reconstruction. Corporate trade shows have been canceled across Iraq, investors are relocating to Amman and Iraq's housing minister estimates that more than 1,500 foreign contractors have fled the country. Bechtel, meanwhile, admits that it can no longer operate "in the hot spots" (there are precious few cold ones), truck drivers are afraid to travel the roads with valuable goods and General Electric has suspended work on key power stations. The timing couldn't be worse: Summer heat is coming and demand for electricity is about to soar.

As this predictable (and predicted) disaster unfolds, many are turning to the United Nations for help: Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called on the UN to support his demand for direct elections back in January. More recently, he has called on the UN to refuse to ratify the despised interim constitution, which most Iraqis see as a US attempt to continue to control Iraq's future long after the June 30 "handover" by, among other measures, giving sweeping veto powers to the Kurds--the only remaining US ally. Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, before pulling out his troops, asked the UN to take over the mission from the United States. Even Muqtada al-Sadr, the "outlaw" Shiite cleric, is calling on the UN to prevent a bloodbath in Najaf. On April 18, Sadr's spokesman, Qais al-Khazaali, told Bulgarian television it is "in the interest of the whole world to send peacekeeping forces under the UN flag."

And what has been the UN's response? Worse than silence, it has sided with Washington on all of these critical questions, dashing hopes that it could provide a genuine alternative to the lawlessness and brutality of the US occupation. First it refused to back the call for direct elections, citing security concerns. In retrospect, supporting the call back then might have avoided much of the violence now engulfing the country. After all, the UN's response weakened the more moderate Sistani and strengthened Muqtada al-Sadr, whose supporters continued demanding direct elections and launched a vocal campaign against the US transition plan and the interim constitution. This is what prompted US chief envoy Paul Bremer to decide to take Sadr out, the provocation that sparked the Shiite uprising.

The UN has proved equally deaf to calls to replace the US military occupation with a peacekeeping operation. On the contrary, it has made it clear that it will only re-enter Iraq if it is the United States that guarantees the safety of its staff--seemingly oblivious to the fact that being surrounded by American bodyguards is the best way to make sure that the UN will be targeted. "We have an obligation since [the attack on UN headquarters] last summer to insist on clarity and on what is being asked of us," Edward Mortimer, a senior aide to Secretary General Kofi Annan, told the New York Times. "What are the risks? What kind of guarantees can you give us that we are not going to be blown up? And is the job important enough to justify the risk?"

Even in light of that horrific bombing, this is a stunning series of questions coming from a UN official. Do Iraqis have guarantees that they won't be blown up when they go to the market in Sadr City, when their children get on the school bus in Basra, when they send their injured to a hospital in Falluja? Is there a more important job for the future of global security than peacemaking in Iraq?

The UN's greatest betrayal of all comes in the way it is re-entering Iraq: not as an independent broker but as a glorified US subcontractor, the political arm of the continued US occupation. The post-June 30 caretaker government being set up by UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi will be subject to all the restraints on Iraqi sovereignty that sparked the current uprising in the first place. The United States will maintain full control over "security" in Iraq, including over Iraq's army. It will keep control over the reconstruction funds. And, worst of all, the caretaker government will be subject to the laws laid out in the interim constitution, including the clause that states that it must enforce the orders written by the US occupiers. The UN should be defending Iraq against this illegal attempt to undermine its independence. Instead it is disgracefully helping Washington to convince the world that a country under continued military occupation by a foreign power is actually sovereign.

Iraq badly needs the UN as a clear, independent voice in the region. The people are calling out for it, begging the international body to live up to its mandate as peacemaker and truth teller. And yet just when it is needed most, the UN is at its most compromised and cowardly.

There is a way that the UN can redeem itself in Iraq. It could choose to join the mutiny, further isolating the United States. This would help force Washington to hand over real power--ultimately to Iraqis but first to a multilateral coalition that did not participate in the invasion and occupation and would have the credibility to oversee direct elections. This could work, but only through a process that fiercely protects Iraq's sovereignty. That means:

Ditch the Interim Constitution. The interim constitution is so widely hated in Iraq that any governing body bound by its rules will immediately be seen as illegitimate. Some argue that Iraq needs the interim constitution to prevent open elections from delivering the country to religious extremists. Yet according to a February 2004 poll by Oxford Research International, Iraqis have no desire to see their country turned into another Iran. Asked to rate their favored political system and actors, 48.5 percent of Iraqis ranked a "democracy" as most important, while an "Islamic state" received 20.5 percent support. Asked what type of politician they favored, 55.3 percent chose "democrats," while only 13.7 percent chose religious politicians. If Iraqis are given the chance to vote their will, there is every reason to expect that the results will reflect a balance between their faith and their secular aspirations.

There are also ways to protect women and minority rights without forcing Iraq to accept a sweeping constitution written under foreign occupation. The simplest solution would be to revive passages in Iraq's 1970 Provisional Constitution, which, according to Human Rights Watch, "formally guaranteed equal rights to women and...specifically ensured their right to vote, attend school, run for political office, and own property." Elsewhere, the constitution enshrined religious freedom, civil liberties and the right to form unions. These clauses can easily be salvaged, while striking the parts of the document designed to entrench Baathist rule.

Put the Money in Trust. A crucial plank of managing Iraq's transition to sovereignty is safeguarding its national assets: its oil revenue and the remaining oil-for-food program money (currently administered by the United States with no oversight), as well as what's left of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction funds. Right now the United States is planning to keep control of this money long after June 30; the UN should insist that it be put in trust, to be spent by an elected Iraqi government.

De-Chalabify Iraq. The United States has so far been unable to install Ahmad Chalabi as the next leader of Iraq--his history of corruption and lack of a political base have seen to that. Yet members of the Chalabi family have quietly been given control in every area of political, economic and judicial life. It was a two-stage process. First, as head of the De-Baathification Commission, Chalabi purged his rivals from power. Then, as director of the Governing Council's Economic and Finance Committee, he installed his friends and allies in the key posts of Oil Minister, Finance Minister, Trade Minister, Governor of the Central Bank and so on. Now Chalabi's nephew, Salem Chalabi, has been appointed by the United States to head the court trying Saddam Hussein. And a company with close ties to Chalabi landed the contract to guard Iraq's oil infrastructure--essentially a license to build a private army.

It's not enough to keep Chalabi out of the interim government. The UN must dismantle Chalabi's shadow state by launching a de-Chalabification process on a par with the now abandoned de-Baathification process.

Demand the Withdrawal of US Troops. In asking the United States to serve as its bodyguard as a condition of re-entering Iraq, the UN has it exactly backwards: It should only go in if the United States pulls out. Troops who participated in the invasion and occupation should be replaced with peacekeepers--preferably from neighboring Arab states--working under the extremely limited mandate of securing the country for general elections. With the United States out, there is a solid chance that countries that opposed the war would step forward for the job.

On April 25 the New York Times editorial board called for the opposite approach, arguing that only a major infusion of American troops and "a real long-term increase in the force in Iraq" could bring security. But these troops, if they arrive, will provide security to no one--not to the Iraqis, not to their fellow soldiers, not to the UN. American soldiers have become a direct provocation to more violence, not only because of the brutality of the occupation in Iraq but also because of US support for Israel's deadly occupation of Palestinian territory. In the minds of many Iraqis, the two occupations have blended into a single anti-Arab outrage, with Israeli and US soldiers viewed as interchangeable and Iraqis openly identifying with Palestinians.

Without US troops, the major incitement to violence would be removed, allowing the country to be stabilized with far fewer soldiers and far less force. Iraq would still face security challenges--there would still be extremists willing to die to impose Islamic law as well as attempts by Saddam loyalists to regain power. On the other hand, with Sunnis and Shiites now so united against the occupation, it's the best possible moment for an honest broker to negotiate an equitable power-sharing agreement.

Some will argue that the United States is too strong to be forced out of Iraq. But from the start Bush needed multilateral cover for this war--that's why he formed the "coalition of the willing," and it's why he is going to the UN now. Imagine what could happen if countries keep pulling out of the coalition, if France and Germany refuse to recognize an occupied Iraq as a sovereign nation. Imagine if the UN decided not to ride to Washington's rescue. It would become an occupation of one.

The invasion of Iraq began with a call to mutiny--a call made by the United States. In the weeks leading up to last year's invasion, US Central Command bombarded Iraqi military and political officials with phone calls and e-mails urging them to defect from Saddam's ranks. Fighter planes dropped 8 million leaflets urging Iraqi soldiers to abandon their posts and assuring that no harm would come to them.

Of course, these soldiers were promptly fired when Paul Bremer took over and are now being frantically rehired as part of the reversal of the de-Baathification policy. It's just one more example of lethal incompetence that should lead all remaining supporters of US policy in Iraq to one inescapable conclusion: It's time for a mutiny.

Naomi Klein is the author of 'No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies' (Picador) and, most recently,' Fences and Windows: Dispatches From the Front Lines of the Globalization Debate'

Copyright © 2004 The Nation

###


:: David 9:46 PM [+] ::
... Comment
:: Thursday, April 29, 2004 ::
Published on Tuesday, April 27, 2004 by the Statesman / Calcutta, India
Soldiers on Hire
by Huck Gutman

During the era of colonial expansion, trading entities such as the Dutch and English East Indies Companies operated as near sovereign powers, commanding armies and navies larger than those in Europe… These firms dominated in non-European areas considered beyond the accepted boundaries of the sovereign system, such as the Indian subcontinent, where local capabilities were weak and transnational companies the most efficiently organized units. — Peter W Singer

The situation in Iraq is going badly for the occupying US forces. Despite a staged-for-television proclamation of victory aboard an aircraft carrier in the Pacific ocean last year, President Bush has recently found his policies, from spurious reasons for waging war against Iraq, to the badly bungled early occupation, to politically-inspired deadlines for handing over “authority” to an as-yet non-existent Iraqi government, criticized more and more frequently.

We live in an age of television, and so it was a televised event that precipitated the current sense of political siege and crisis within the White House. Four Americans were ambushed as they drove through Fallujah in north-central Iraq. They were dragged from their vehicle, killed, set afire, and dismembered. The charred remains of one body were hung from a bridge; those of another were dragged behind a car for 50 kilometers.

The broadcast of these events were “read” very differently in West Asia than in the USA. In West Asia, despite the horrendous brutality of the Iraqi mob – even in warfare, even in great enmity, human tradition demands respect for the bodies of the slain – many cheered the pictures as signs that US power was vulnerable and capable of being attacked. Their response was understandable: the world’s sole superpower seemed, as images flashed across the television screen, to be unable to ward off attacks from indignant and angry civilians. The power of the street met the power of a mechanized, automated army, and for a few minutes at least, the street won.

US reaction was shock. The images were indeed brutal, and the multiple violations – of the safety of American persons, of civilized norms of behavior, and ultimately of US supremacy and invulnerability – were shocking to the American public. The Bush administration kept quiet, for what could the President say: his victorious war no longer looked victorious, not when images of the barbaric treatment of Americans flashed on the television screen. It was a very tough day in the White House.

As the world knows, the aftermath was powerful and disturbing. Iraqis were emboldened to attack Americans all over the nation, with Sunnis and Shias (those formerly supposedly implacable antagonists) promising to aid one another in driving out the occupying aggressor. US troops, for their part, mobilized and both surrounded and penetrated Fallujah, with heavy and bloody casualties, mostly Iraqi citizens, not all of whom were in any way combatants.

I want to look at one of the many issues that arose from that moment of violence in Fallujah, that moment when four Americans were killed. Why, Americans wondered at first, were there no US forces ready to intervene? Even if it is impossible to prevent or undo an ambush, it is certainly possible to move in militarily to prevent bodies from being dishonored. After all, the record, both in literature and history, of military men showing great courage to protect both their wounded and their dead is extensive. So why didn’t US troops rush in to protect their fallen comrades?

The answer is profoundly revealing. The fallen men were not, in any real sense, their comrades. They were Americans, and they were soldiers of a sort, but they were not US soldiers. They worked for a corporation, Blackwater Security Consulting, which supplies military personnel on a contract basis: these were soldiers for hire, or as they would have been called in a time when English had not been debased by the “spin” of political posturing, mercenaries. They were in Iraq not to fight for democracy or even domination, but because they were paid handsomely to be there – and paid by a company whose sole business is to make a profit.

Sometimes dramatic changes take place in the world, hidden from sight, until a moment occurs when they erupt into public consciousness. So it was with the four Americans killed in Fallujah. The existence of a privatized military industry was known to military leaders around the globe, to corporate executives of multinational companies engaged in business in “risky” areas, and to despots and insurgent militias all over the developing world. But, in general, the citizenry of the world, and especially the USA, was unaware that the nature of warfare is changing, and changing rapidly.

Warfare is less and less the domain of states, and more and more an area of for corporate investment, growth and control. Warfare, in blunt terms, is being increasingly privatized as we enter the 21st century.

There is no arguing with economic facts. The privatized military “industry,” in the words of Peter Singer, an expert on this new economic reality, “has several hundred companies, operating in over 10 countries on six continents, and over $100 billion in annual global revenue.”

Here is Singer elsewhere: though writing in an academic publication, he nonetheless has great real-world cogency. “PMFs [privatized military firms] represent the newest additions to the modern battlefield, and their role in contemporary warfare is becoming increasingly significant. Not since the 18th century has there been such reliance on private soldiers to accomplish tasks directly affecting the tactical and strategic success of engagement… PMFs may well portend the new business face of war.”

Singer and I disagree about the importance of structure, since he maintains that PMFs are “fundamentally different [than mercenaries]: the critical analytic factor is their modern corporate business form.” That modern mercenaries are employees of a modern corporation, hired through “conventional” hiring practices, serving in a hierarchical business administrative structure, generating returns for investors, does not mean that they are not fundamentally soldiers for hire, nor that those who supply them – as in former years Hesse in Germany, or Switzerland, or Nepal – are not in it for the money. (It should come as no surprise that the Nepalese gorkhas are, once again, a part of the new mercenary forces: fighters for hire remain fighters for hire.)

Singer is remarkably cogent in his analysis (readers are referred to his Corporate Warriors: The Rise and Ramifications of the Privatized Military Industry, originally published by International Security). He points out that the market-based approach toward military services is as, “one analyst puts it, ‘the ultimate representation of neo-liberalism.’” In particular, he sees PMFs as a logical consequence of the two major capitalist innovations of the late 20th century, outsourcing and globalization. Military affairs – from maintenance and supply, to support, to actual fighting – can profitably be outsourced; the labor supply to provide trainers, logistical support, and warriors is an international market.

The former anti-apartheid military and militias of South Africa are fertile hiring sources; so are not only former Soviet soldiers, but also the officers and operatives of the KGB. Those who were behind the Bank of Credit and Commerce International debacle are deeply enmeshed in arranging financing in the new military-for-hire industry, as are those who supplied illegal arms in the American Iran-Contra scandal. Employment in this new industry – soldiers for hire – is more about toughness and getting the job done, than about vetting potential employees for any ethical standards, even vestigial ones.

Which brings us to Iraq. There are important reasons why the USA has depended heavily on privatized military firms to undergird the war and occupation efforts in Iraq. Most of them are not pretty – to my mind, some are actually corrupt.

The author, a former Fulbright Visiting Professor at Calcutta University, is Professor of English at the University of Vermont.

Copyright 2004 The Statesman


:: David 3:46 AM [+] ::
... Comment

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